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RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS-JURISDICTION-EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE SHERMAN ACT-A NEW ANALYsIS-Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America' provides a thorough
and far-ranging analysis of the limitations on the extraterritorial appli-
cation of American antitrust laws. The Ninth Circuit was faced with
allegations of a conspiracy whose participants included foreign nationals
and which was carried out largely through activity outside of the United
States. The court held, first, that the involvement of the judiciary of
a foreign country to preserve a security interest in land did not consti-
tute the act of a sovereign state which would render the activities com-
plained of immune from scrutiny by a court of this country,2 and sec-
ond, that assertion of subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate despite
the foreign elements which the case presented. 3 In deciding the juris-
dictional question, the court adopted a new multiple factor analysis
4
which will have a significant impact on future foreign commerce cases
which involve conflicting national policies and interests.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Although other acts of misconduct were alleged, the following events
comprised the major part of the conspiracy as described in the com-
plaint: In 1971 and 1972, Timberlane, an Oregon partnership, was
preparing to enter the lumber export business in Honduras. Two sub-
sidiary corporations were formed in Honduras in order to purchase lum-
ber and conduct milling operations there, and the plant facilities of a
former milling business were acquired. At the time of the purchase,
certain claims on this property were held by the Bank of America and
by a company which would have been one of Timberlane's major com-
petitors in the Honduran lumber business. Timberlane attempted to
purchase these claims without success. Instead, they were conveyed
1. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing
en banc March 3, 1977.
2. 549 F.2d at 608.
3. Id. at 615.
4. Id. at 614.
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to a third party, who, in furtherance of the conspiracy, sought judicial
help in enforcing them.5
A court-ordered attachment known as an "embargo" was obtained
against the Honduran subsidiaries in order to prevent the property from
being sold. Further, in order to prevent diminution in the value of
the property, a judicial officer called an "interventor" was appointed.
The interventor, who was allegedly on the payroll of the bank, caused
troops temporarily to shut down the milling operation, thereby thwart-
ing Timberlane's efforts to establish itself as a competitor in the Hon-
duran lumber market. 6
Thus Timberlane sketched a conspiracy on the part of the bank and
others to prevent it from exporting lumber from Honduras to the
United States and to insure that a monopoly in the Honduran lumber
export business remained in the hands of its two major competitors. 7
Timberlane brought suit for damages, alleging violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Acts and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act.'
Among the corporations and individuals named as defendants were citi-
zens of the United States, Honduras, and Canada.10
The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the in-
volvement of the Honduran judiciary through the conduct of the inter-
5. Id. at 604-05.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 601.
8. Id. at 600.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I '(Supp. V 1975), provides in relevant part
that "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal."
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), provides in relevant part
that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, . . ."
9. 54 F.2d at 600.
Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970), provides in relevant part:
Every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is declared to be
contrary to public policy, illegal, and void when the same is made by or between
two or more persons or corporations, either of whom, as agent or principal, is
engaged in importing any article from any foreign country into the United States,
and when such combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is intended
to operate in restraint of lawful trade, or free competition in lawful trade or
commerce, or to increase the market price in any part of the United States of
any article or articles imported or intended to be imported into the United States,
or of any manufacture into which such imported article enters or is intended to
enter. Every person who shall be engaged in the importation of goods or any
foreign country in violation of this section, or who shall combine or conspire with
another to violate the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor, . . .
10. 549 F.2d at 603-04.
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ventor was the act of a sovereign state which could not be reviewed
by a court of this country," and that since there was no direct and sub-
stantial effect on United States foreign commerce, the court was without
jurisdiction. 12
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Since there was uncertainty as to the
grounds for the district court's dismissal, the court examined both the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claim for relief and the question of subject
matter jurisdiction.'" Following this bifurcated analysis, the court held,
first, that the act of state doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs' claim for
relief,' 4 and, second, that there was a sufficient basis for exercising sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.'5
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The most frequently quoted explanation of the act of state doctrine
was provided in Underhill v. Hernandez:'6
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves.17
As explained by Justice Harlan in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino,'8 if not constitutionally required, the doctrine nonetheless has
"'constitutional' underpinnings" in the concept of separation of powers
and represents judicial deference to the notion that foreign relations
are properly the concern of the executive, rather than the judicial
branch.' Thus, in a given case, the doctrine may require that a court
11. Id. at 601 & n.3. The lower court's decision was not published.
12. Id.
13. The finding of the district court that the acts complained of had no "direct and
substantial" effect on United States foreign commerce could have been the basis of a
dismissal either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim for
relief. Id. The Ninth Circuit treated the dismissal as if based on the latter ground,
and found that dismissal without allowing discovery was inappropriate under FED. R.
Crv. P. 12(b) (6) and 56(e). Id. at 601-03.
14. Id. at 608.
15. Id. at 615.
16. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
17. Id. at 252.
18. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
19. Id. at 423, 427-28.
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refrain from adjudicating the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign
within its borders to avoid embarrassing the executive branch in its con-
duct of foreign affairs.20 It has been stated that a second basis for the
doctrine is that "external deference" to the laws of a foreign sovereign
promotes the growth of international law and provides a principled
means of ordering relations between nation-states.2 '
The earliest and best-known application of the doctrine in an anti-
trust case is Justice Holmes' opinion in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.22  The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendant, a New
Jersey corporation, engaged in the banana export business in Central
America, had, as part of a scheme to prevent competition by the plain-
tiff, induced the Costa Rican government to seize its plantation during
a border dispute with Panama. 23  As one ground for affirming dismis-
sal of the complaint, Justice Holmes found the seizure to be the act
of a sovereign state within its own territory and thus not reviewable
by a court in the United States.
4
The latest reliance on the act of state doctrine in an antitrust case
was in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 2 5  The
plaintiffs held an oil drilling concession in the territorial waters of the
Trucial State of Umm al Qaywayn; they alleged that as part of an anti-
competitive conspiracy the defendants induced both the neighboring
state of Sharjah and the government of Iran to claim sovereignty over
the area of the concession and thereby disrupt the plaintiffs' drilling
20. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-98 (1976); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964).
21. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
8-9 (1964); Simson, The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary Perspective on
American Antitrust Abroad, 9 INT'L L. & ECON. 233, 251 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Simson].
This second rationale for the act of state doctrine has received at least implicit judicial
recognition in the past, as indicated by this statement from Sabbatino: "[W]e conclude
that both the national interest and progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of
law among nations are best served by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this
realm of its application." 376 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). However, later Supreme
Court opinions have placed primary reliance on the separation of powers rationale. See
Alfred Dunhil of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-98 (1976); First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-69 (1972) (opinion of Rehnquist,
J.).
22. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
23. Id. at 354-55.
24. Id. at 357-58. A second basis for the decision was that the Sherman Act was
not intended to cover extraterritorial activity. Id. at 355-57. See note 41 infra and ac-
companying text.
25. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 965 (1972).
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operations."' The district court, in an opinion which was summarily
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,2 7 found a sufficient basis for the exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction in that the plaintiffs had alleged a "direct"
restraint on American foreign commerce,"8 but held that the territorial
claims asserted by the two foreign governments were acts of state which
barred the plaintiffs' claim for relief.2"
In Timberlane, the district court found Occidental Petroleum con-
trolling and ruled that the involvement of the Honduran courts was an
act of state which it was precluded from examining."0 Upon appeal,
the Ninth Circuit, without expressly distinguishing Occidental Petro-
leum, found that the judicial involvement did not give effect to any pub-
lic policy of Honduras so as to warrant application of the act of state
doctrine:
The so-called "act of state" here was the application by the courts
and their agents of the Honduran laws concerning security interests
and the protection of the underlying property against diminution ...
There is no indication that the court action reflected any official Hon-
duran policy that Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or that trade
with the United States should be restrained. Timberlane does not...
challenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any fashion that appears
on its face to hold any threat to relations between Honduras and the
United States.
31
The court in Timberlane thus refused to defer automatically to the
involvement of the Honduran courts and instead sought to determine
whether any foreign governmental policies would be impaired by appli-
cation of American law. This analysis would appear consistent with
the view expressed in Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine does not
automatically confer immunity upon all actions of a foreign govern-
ment, but instead calls for a balancing of the "relevant considerations"
in each case.32 At the same time, the Timberlane court may have been
26. Id. at 98-101.
27. 461 F.2d 1261 (1972).
28. 331 F. Supp. at 102-03.
29. Id. at 113.
30. 549 F.2d 601 & n.3.
31. Id. at 15.
32. 376 U.S. at 428. In Occidental Petroleum, the court found that adjudication of
the plaintiffs' claim would not require settling an international boundary dispute, a con-
tention raised by the defendants on their motion to dismiss. 331 F. Supp. at 104. The
court further found that the states which had asserted sovereignty over the area of the
oil-drilling concession did not need to be joined as parties under FED. R. CIV. P. 19 be-
cause a decree could be fashioned which would not affect them. Id. at 106-07. For
these reasons, the decision has been criticized for applying the act of state doctrine too
mechanically instead of adhering to the balancing approach called for in Sabbatino.
1977]
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following certain implications of the Supreme Court's recent narrow
reading of the act of state doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba.
33
In Dunhill, interventors, officials appointed by the Cuban govern-
ment to operate nationalized cigar manufacturing firms, successfully
sought payments from importers in the United States for the purchase
price of cigars imported following nationalization of the industry in
1960. Dunhill, one of the importers, counterclaimed for a greater sum
allegedly owing because it had mistakenly paid the interventors the pur-
chase price of cigars ordered before nationalization. A bare majority
of the Court held that the refusal to return these payments, as ex-
pressed by Cuban counsel in court, did not amount to an act of state
and that Dunhill's claim against the interventors was not barred. 4 In
addition, four justices35 were of the opinion that the act of state doctrine
should never be applicable when a foreign government engages in
"commercial" as opposed to "governmental" activity. 0
While adhering in part to the balancing approach of Sabbatino, Jus-
tice White's opinion in Dunhil137 formulates the rule, presumably to be
Simson, supra note 21, at 261. The reasoning in Timberlane would seem to be an im-
plicit rejection of the approach followed in Occidental Petroleum, although the factual
differences between the two cases might also explain why the Ninth Circuit in Timber-
lane did not find its decision in Occidental Petroleum controlling.
33. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
34. Id. at 694-95.
35. While he joined in the majority opinion, Justice Stevens did not concur in that
portion setting forth the commercial-governmental distinction. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
36. Justice White developed this distinction by analogizing to the "restrictive" theory
of sovereign immunity which posits that a sovereign government which engages in "com-
mercial or proprietary" activity will not be accorded immunity from suit on claims aris-
ing out of that activity. Id. at 698-705. Subsequently, the restrictive view of sovereign
immunity was adopted by Congress in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
Pub. L No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332
(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611). Section 1605(a) of the Act pro-
vides in part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States; .. .
37. Justice White expressed his rationale for the distinction in part. as follows:
[Slubjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial dealings
presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt
to pass on the legality of their governmental acts. In their commercial capacities,
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of general application, that "repudiation by a sovereign of a commercial
debt is not an act of state. '38  This approach clearly seems at variance
with the approach of Sabbatino. The commercial-governmental dis-
tinction, of course, was not applicable in Timberlane since there the
asserted act of state was court action; however, there are other implica-
tions in the majority opinion in Dunhill that tend to narrow the act of
state doctrine which the Timberlane court may have found persua-
sive. 9
It would seem that the commercial-governmental distinction, if fol-
lowed, will have a great impact in future antitrust cases. 40 If the act
foreign governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. . . . Sub-
jecting then in connection with such acts to the same rules as private citizens is
unlikely to touch very sharply on "national nerves."
425 U.S. 703-04 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 697 n.12.
39. In that part of the Dunhill opinion in which a majority of the Court joined, Jus-
tice White observed that "[n]o statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban govern-
ment itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated her obligations
in general or any class thereof or that she had as a sovereign matter determined to con-
fiscate the amounts due three foreign importers." Id. at 695. This language was quoted
by the Timberlane court. 549 F.2d at 606. The statement may simply be another way
of saying that the defendants in Dunhill had failed to meet their burden of proof on
the act of state issue; it also suggests that whether governmental activity is an act of
state entitled to immunity is a question to be determined by examining the formalities
with which the act is executed. In this respect, as well as in the commercial-govern-
mental distinction enunciated in the plurality opinion, the decision may represent a de-
parture from Sabbatino, where the Court refused to lay down an "inflexible and all-en-
compassing rule." 376 U.S. at 428.
40. For example, adoption of this rule would have a significant impact on the ques-
tion whether the well-known anticompetitive activities of the Arab members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and of the League of Arab States
are reachable under American antitrust laws. There seems to be no real dispute that
many of these activities, if engaged in by private individuals, would violate the antitrust
laws. See, e.g., Timberg, Sovereign Immunity Act of State Defenses: Transnational
Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L REV. 1, 2-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Timberg]; Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels under United
States Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW 617, 622 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Joelson & Griffin]; Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott,
74 MICH. L. REv. 795, 798-803 (1976). One study of the Arab oil embargo and produc-
tion cutbacks in 1973 and the subsequent increases in the price of oil concluded that
there were no satisfactory guidelines under existing law to determine if the defenses of
sovereign immunity and act of state would apply. Joelson & Griffin, supra, at 629-
36.
The enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the full judicial accept-
ance of the restrictive view of the act of state doctrine which may follow will provide
considerably more guidance in this area. Not all boycotting practices and cartel-related
activities would automatically fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the United States.
Serious questions would remain as to the propriety of interfering with those practices,
otherwise commercial in nature, which constitute acts of economic warfare against a
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of state doctrine is construed more narrowly by courts in the future,
the question of the proper bases for subject matter jurisdiction may as-
sume increasing importance in foreign commerce cases. Accordingly,
that aspect of the court's analysis in Timberlane should be examined.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN
FOREIGN COMMERCE CASES
The restrictive territorial view of the reach of the antitrust laws, as
established by the Supreme Court in the American Banana case,41 has
not been widely followed. Succeeding foreign commerce cases found
that American law was applicable despite the fact that some of the al-
legedly illegal conduct took place outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States. 41 It has been pointed out,43 however, that all of the
foreign commerce cases following American Banana included allega-
tions that some of the relevant activity had taken place in the United
States, 4 or, at the least, that foreign defendants were acting in concert
with a domestic party;45 it may be inferred that a nexus of this type
third country. Timberg, supra, at 31, 37. Moreover, the difficult question whether ac-
tivity by a foreign government should be considered commercial or governmental would
have to be decided in each case. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the current develop-
ments in the law will significantly curtail the possibilities of successfully asserting these
defenses in many cases.
41. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355, 357 (1909).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
43. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINEss ABROAD 70 (1958) [herein-
after cited as BREWSTER].
44. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). In this case,
certain United States and Mexican corporations had conspired to monopolize interstate
and foreign commerce in sisal. It was alleged that the defendants, as part of the con-
spiracy, had obtained discriminatory legislation from the governments of Mexico and
Yucatan which gave one of the foreign co-conspirators an exclusive agency to buy and
sell sisal in those countries. The court distinguished American Banana and expressed
its rationale for exercising jurisdiction in these terms: "Here we have a contract, combi-
nation and conspiracy entered into by parties within the United States and made effec-
tive by acts done therein. . . . True, the conspirators were aided by discriminating leg-
islation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought about forbid-
den results within the United States." Id. at 276.
45. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Several
American corporations entered into a conspiracy with a British corporation to divide
among them the world market in tobacco. A second British corporation was formed
to conduct the export business of all the parties involved. All of the anticompetitive
activities of the British corporations took place outside the United States. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act reached these activities because the for.
eign defendants had participated in a conspiracy which involved United States citizens
and which had affected American interstate and foreign commerce. Id. at 184-85.
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was deemed a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction over extra-
territorial activity.
For this reason, Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the leading case
of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)46 represented
a significant departure from earlier analyses of the question of subject
matter jurisdiction. Alcoa, a United States corporation, and Limited,
a Canadian corporation, were both charged with participation in the
"Alliance," a multinational cartel based in Switzerland whose members
had restricted the import of aluminum into the United States in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The evidence was insufficient to establish
that Alcoa had actually participated in the Alliance.4 7 However, even
without this nexus, Judge Hand found that the Sherman Act could ap-
propriately reach the participation in the cartel of Limited, the Cana-
dian defendant, because the agreements it had entered into were in-
tended to cause an adverse effect on this country's foreign commerce
and had actually accomplished that effect.48
From the opinion in Alcoa was derived the "effects test"''  for deter-
mining the scope of jurisdiction. In diverse formulations this test was
applied in succeeding foreign commerce cases;50 it is reflected in the
46. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. Id. at 442.
48. Id. at 444. In requiring that there be an intended effect on this country's com-
merce, Judge Hand was purporting to delimit the application of the Sherman Act to ex-
traterritorial activity. Id. at 443-44. It is questionable that he accomplished this result.
Once intent was proved, the burden shifted to Limited to show that its activities in the
cartel had not restricted imports into the United States. Id. at 444-45.
49. The view that jurisdiction over extraterritorial activity can be based upon the ef-
fects on United States interstate or foreign commerce is an extension of the territorial
principle of jurisdiction which is usually denominated the "objective territorial principle."
Under this principle, the occurrence of a forbidden effect within a jurisdiction establishes
the competency of that jurisdiction to declare illegal the extraterritorial activity which
caused that effect the same as if that activity had occurred within its borders. W. Fu-
GATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 35-39 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as FuGATE]; cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L W OF THE
UNrrED STATES § 18(b) & Comments f, g, i (1965) (see note 55 infra) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT]. The reasoning followed in Alcoa has been criticized as a mis-
application of this principle and as contrary to generally-accepted notions of international
law. Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558
,(1967). Thus, while a jurisdiction may validly proscribe extraterritorial conduct which
causes within its border an effect such as the death of an individual, the importation of
prohibited goods, or the commission of a fraud, id. at 564-65, there is no recognized
basis for declaring as illegal extraterritorial activity which leads only to a negative effect
within the jurisdiction (i.e., the restraint on the import of aluminum), when that juris-
diction cannot validly require the opposite positive effect-in this case an order directing
the foreign producers to ship aluminum into the United States. Id. at 565, 569.
50. E.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949,
1977]
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district court's finding in Timberlane that the plaintiffs' allegations
failed to establish a "direct and substantial effect on United States for-
eign commerce .... ."1 The Ninth Circuit surveyed the varying ap-
plications of the test since Alcoa, reviewed the criticism that had been
leveled against it, and concluded that in a case with multinational ele-
ments, the effects test was inadequate to decide whether jurisdiction
should be asserted. The test's major shortcoming, the court reasoned,
was that "it fail[ed] to consider the other nation's interests [and] ex-
pressly [to] take into account the full nature of the relationship be-
tween the actors and this country."52
Instead, the court determined that the appropriate analysis in a case
of this nature was one which can be divided into three parts. The dis-
trict court must first determine whether the alleged restraint is suffi-
cient to support subject matter jurisdiction and to raise a claim for relief
under the antitrust laws; in making these two determinations, a focus
on the nature and magnitude of the effect on commerce is appropri-
ate.53 Additionally, the court must decide whether the interests of, and
contacts with, the United States are sufficient to justify the assertion
of jurisdiction in the fact of conflicting foreign policies and interests.
953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afI'd, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969);
United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
The intent component of Judge Hand's formulation has not been significantly fol-
lowed. In United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), the court
found that a specific intent to violate this country's antitrust laws was not necessary to
justify the assertion of jurisdiction over the conduct of a foreign defendant. The court
found that the defendant knew or "should have known" of the adverse impact on United
States commerce of its activities and that "its . . . apathy to the impact of its real rela-
tionship with General Electric [the domestic defendant] upon . . . [the antitrust laws]
was an indifference to them that amounted to a willingness to be a party to a breach
of them." Id. at 891. Thereafter, as the Timberlane court ioted, the focus in cases
using this test has been on the proper characterization of the effect necessary to support
jurisdiction. See 549 F.2d at 610-11. As a result, the rule has been stated quite broadly
with no mention of the intent requirement:
The antitrust laws of this country extend to any activity [unless plainly and clearly
exempted by statute], whether carried on by a foreigner or a citizen, which affects
the trade and the commerce of the United States; and this is so irrespective of the
citizenship of the actor and the place where the activity took place . . . "The
vital question in all cases is the same: Is the combination to so operate in this
country as to directly and materially affect our foreign commerce? . .
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), ajf'd, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969) (citations omit-
ted).
51. 549 F.2d at 601.
52. Id. at 611-12.
53. While acknowledging that a greater showing of effect or restraint is necessary to
state a claim for relief than to establish a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, id. at
613, the court also noted that in neither case did a "direct and substantial" effect on
foreign commerce need to be established. Id, at 615 & n.35,
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Here the effects test is inadequate; rather, the court should apply a
"jurisdictional rule of reason." 4 The factors to be weighed under this
approach include the following:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of busi-
nesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance to the
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as com-
pared with conduct abroad.55
Following this three part analysis, the court determined first, that the
allegation of a restraint on the export of lumber from Honduras to the
United States provided a basis for the exercise of subject matter juris-
diction; second, that the magnitude of the alleged restraint was suffi-
cient to raise a claim under the Sherman Act; and third, that on the
record before it, there was no reason to refrain from exercising jurisdic-
tion.56
IV. WEIGHING THE FACTORS:
A JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
The jurisdictional rule of reason set forth in Timberlane does not
represent a total departure from judicial precedent, even though it finds
little express support in prior antitrust cases. 57 It has always been ac-
54. Id. at 613. The phrase was coined by Kingman Brewster. BREwsTER, supra note
43, at 446.
55. 549 F.2d at 614 (footnote omitted). The court made it clear that this multiple
factor approach was relevant not to determine the question of jurisdictional power, but to
decide whether in light of considerations of international comity and fairness to the lit-
igants, jurisdiction should be asserted. Id. at 613. In this respect, the approach is simi-
lar to that of § 40 of the Restatement, which also operates only after a sufficient basis
for subject matter jurisdiction has been found. RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 40,
Comment 2 at 120-21. However, the approach in Timberlane is broader than that of
the Restatement. Section 40, while enumerating many of the same factors, applies only
when the rules of two or more nations "may require inconsistent conduct upon the part
of a person." By contrast, Timberlane appears to require a balancing of the relevant
factors in all cases which involve international elements, without a showing of the possi-
bility of inconsistent legal obligations.
56. 549 F.2d 615.
57. The only case relied on by the Timberlane court which explicitly employed a bal-
ancing approach to solve the question of subject matter jurisdiction was Lauritzen v. Lar-
sen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), a case involving a claim under the Jones Act. See 549 F.2d
at 614. On the other hand, the opinion in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
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knowledged that our antitrust laws were not intended to have unlimited
application with respect to extraterritorial conduct. Judge Hand ex-
plained one of the most basic limits on the assertion of extraterritorial
authority as follows: "[T]he only question . . . is whether Congress
intended to impose the liability, and whether our own Constitution per-
mitted it to do so. . . . We should not impute to Congress an intent
to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States."58 In the context of statutory inter-
pretation, he delimited the reach of jurisdiction by focusing on the ef-
fects of the defendant's activity-specifically, by requiring an effect on
the commerce of the United States which was intended by the defend-
ant.59 Timberlane incorporates and expands this effects-oriented anal-
ysis by including as relevant criteria "the extent to which there is ex-
plicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce" and "the foresee-
ability of such effect."6
In some respects, then, Timberlane continues the method of hand-
ling the problem of extraterritoriality which was followed in Alcoa. In
particular, the intent component of Alcoa, a principle which virtually
has lain dormant since that case was decided," has been reemphasized
in Timberlane. Its significance can be seen by examining its potential
interplay with nationality, another factor which the Timberlane court
incorporated into the third part of its analysis."2
While there is support for the idea that the United States could exer-
cise jurisdiction over the activities of its citizens solely on the basis of
their citizenship, 3 the nationality or citizenship principle has not been
relied upon extensively in cases dealing with the question of jurisdiction
over extraterritorial conduct. 4 In United States v. R.P. Oldham Co.,65
for example, the court attached little significance to the fact that all
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), also cited by the Timberlane court, does not employ
balancing language and is addressed principally to the question whether the act of state
doctrine applied in that factual situation. See 370 U.S. at 706-07. The principal sup-
port for the multiple factor jurisdictional test comes from the secondary authorities cited
by the court in Timberlane. 549 F.2d at 613-14 nn.29 & 31,
58. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
60. 549 F.2d at 614.
61. See note 50 supra.
62. 549 F.2d at 614.
63. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 49, § 30.
64. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach
of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 Onio ST. L. 586, 603-10 (1961).
65. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
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of the defendants in an action based on an international conspiracy
were citizens of the United States. Instead, the court justified its con-
clusion that there was a basis for jurisdiction on the fact that the de-
fendants' activities, even though completely extraterritorial, had caused
a "direct and substantial" effect on this country's commerce. 66
However, with the new emphasis on nationality mandated by Timber-
lane, this factor, when weighed with other relevant considerations,
might serve in a given case to justify affirmatively the exercise of juris-
diction67 or to support a conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction is
improper."8 It is with respect to the defendant's nationality that the
question of intent becomes relevant. Normally, neither section one nor
section two of the Sherman Act requires that a specific intent to violate
the antitrust laws be established.6 9 In most cases, where, for example,
the defendants are all United States citizens, or where, as in Timber-
lane, foreign nationals have acted in concert with United States citi-
zens,70 there would be little reason to look beyond the general intent
requirement when determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
appropriate. However, where all the named defendants are foreign
nationals who have acted abroad, fairness to the defendants might re-
quire that a showing of specific intent be made to justify the assertion
of jurisdiction.71  Tightening the intent requirement in such a case
66. Id. at 822.
67. If the Timberlane court is correct in its assumption that courts in past foreign
commerce cases have tacitly considered other factors besides the effect on this country's
commerce, then the court in R.P. Oldham Co. may in fact have silently attached signif-
icance to the defendants' citizenship. See 549 F.2d at 612.
68. The relevance of nationality as a limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction was ex-
plicitly recognized in two cases dealing with actions for trademark infringement. In
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction under the Lanham Act to prevent the unfair use of the plain-
tiffs trademark in Mexico by the defendant, a citizen of the United States. Subse-
quently, in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), modi-
lied, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), Steele was distinguished in part on the basis of the
defendant's nationality, and relief was denied since the defendant was a Canadian cit-
izen.
69. Intent is presumed if it is shown that the normal and probable consequences of
the defendant's activity are results forbidden by either section. FUGATE, supra note 49,
at 17, 74.
70. See 549 F.2d at 603-04.
71. One exponent of a balancing approach asserted that an explicit purpose to harm
this country's commerce is so important that express proof of such purpose should be
made a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction in this factual setting. BREWSTER,
supra note 43, at 446, 448. Whereas the Timberlane approach merely calls for the na-
ture of the defendant's intent to be weighed with all other relevant considerations, it
seems likely that, in effect, the character of the defendant's intent would be accorded
almost the same importance under this approach. See, e.g., Simson, supra note 21, at
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could clearly advance principles of international comity as well as insure
fairness to the litigants. 72  Thus, sensitive application of the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason in future foreign commerce cases may significantly
revitalize the intent component of Alcoa.
While building in part on the implications in Alcoa, the rule set forth
in Timberlane calls for a much broader inquiry. This departure from
the relatively narrow focus of the effects test is well illustrated by the
Timberlane court's direction that district courts consider "the extent to
which enforcement by either state [which has jurisdiction with respect
to the conduct of the parties] can be expected to achieve compli-
ance." 73  This factor, apparently adopted wholesale from the Restate-
ment,74 seems to incorporate pragmatic considerations as well as a con-
cern for international comity and fairness; specifically, it may reflect
a desire to avoid situations such as the aftermath of United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI).75  In ICI, the district court's
remedial decree affecting a foreign defendant led to a foreign court's
judgment that the defendant could not legally comply with that de-
cree. 70  Even though there is disagreement as to the extent to which
the action of the district court in ICI violated principles of comity,
77
the frustration of the effectiveness of the decree is clear. The ap-
proach adopted in Timberlane would seem to call for total jurisdictional
246; Note, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the Reach
of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REy. 1031, 1056 (1967).
72. Similarly, Judge Hand acknowledged in Alcoa that "international complications"
might arise if the United States asserted jurisdiction over agreements formed abroad by
foreign nationals which caused unintended effects on this country's commerce. 148 F.2d
at 443.
73. 549 F.2d at 614.
74. See RnSTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 40(e).
75. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), opinion on relief, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
76. In ICI, DuPont, an American Corporation, and ICI, a British corporation, were
found guilty of a conspiracy effectuated in part by the use of patents. The remedial
decree fashioned by the district court called for the compulsory licensing of certain pat-
ents held by DuPont and directed that ICI grant immunity under the corresponding
patents which it held and reassign them to DuPont. Thereafter, a British company which
previously had entered into a contract with ICI to be granted exclusive licenses under
the patents in question brought suit to prevent ICI's compliance with the decree. The
British court enjoined ICI from obeying the order of the American court and later or-
dered specific performance of ICI's contract with the British plaintiff. British Nylon
Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19, 24, aff'd, [1954]
3 All E. R. 88.
77. Compare Simson, supra note 21, at 241-42, with FuGAT, supra note 49, at 130-
34.
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forbearance when an impasse of this type could be predicted with cer-
tainty.
However, total dismissal in many cases seems unnecessarily drastic.
Often, shaping the remedial decree to avoid a conflict with foreign law
would appear sufficient to prevent any violation of principles of comity
or imposition of an unnecessary hardship on a foreign defendant.
78
This flexibility is built into the Restatement approach, which calls for
a court "to consider . . .moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction" when necessary. 79 It is unclear, however, whether this
same rationale was adopted by the Timberlane court or whether the
only recourse when the assertion of jurisdiction appears likely to dam-
age foreign interests is outright dismissal. Thus, clarification of this
area by the Ninth Circuit is called for.
V. THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
AND ACT OF STATE
The wide-ranging thrust of the decision in Timberlane suggests that
the development of a jurisdictional rule of reason conflicts with the re-
strictive view of the act of state doctrine that is likely to gain currency.
80
If given full judicial recognition,8' the commercial-governmental dis-
tinction will curtail the applicability of the act of state doctrine by creat-
ing a large class of activities to which the doctrine does not afford im-
munity; in cases involving the commercial activities of foreign govern-
ments, adjudication of the rights of the individual litigants will assume
paramountcy. The rationale behind the jurisdictional rule of reason
is more expansive. Courts which follow its mandate must serve dual
goals: in applying the balancing test, they must be concerned not only
with effectuating the policies behind the antitrust laws but also with
avoiding unnecessary encroachment upon the interests of other nations.
In practical effect, application of the rule in Timberlane will require
courts to identify and weigh many of the same considerations which
78. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J.
1954).
79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 49, § 40.
80. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
81. Adherence to a restrictive view of the act of state doctrine would appear necessary
to avoid thwarting the policies behind the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)
(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611). See Timberg, supra note 40, at 31; cf.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-705
(1976) (opinion of White, J.) (rationale behind restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
supports adoption of restrictive theory of act of state).
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are relevant in an analysis under the act of state doctrine.8 2  For ex-
ample, a case may involve the activities of a foreign nationalized indus-
try which are questionable under the American antitrust laws; even if
the activities are found to be "commercial" and thus not entitled to im-
munity as acts of state, the significant governmental involvement must
be accounted for and might require dismissal unless the contacts and
interests of the United States are substantial. It might thus appear that
the jurisdictional analysis set forth in Timberlane is antithetical to the
act of state doctrine as it is evolving and that it might often frustrate
the purposes behind the restrictive theories of sovereign immunity and
act of state. In other words, it might be asserted that under the guise
of jurisdictional analysis the Timberlane court has erected a new barrier
to suit which the legislative and judicial development in the above areas
had operated to eliminate.
For several reasons, the conflict is more apparent than real. The
act of state doctrine and the jurisdictional test are fundamentally differ-
ent in conception and operation. While considerations of comity
underlie each,8 3 the jurisdictional rule does not share with the act of state
doctrine the same concern for maintaining separation of powers within
the national government with respect to foreign affairs.8 4 The act of
state doctrine is an affirmative defense 8 which has been applied pri-
marily in cases involving foreign expropriations.8 By contrast, the ju-
risdictional rule of Timberlane, although theoretically applicable to the
question of extraterritoriality in general, 7 has thus far been limited by
the Ninth Circuit to defining the reach of the antitrust laws and of
closely-related trademark regulations."8 While many of the surround-
ing procedural aspects are unclear, it appears certain that the jurisdic-
tional rule will not impose the same heavy burden of proof as the act
82. In fact, the Timberlane court explicitly called for recognition that the aims of the
two doctrines are similar: "The act of state doctrine ... demonstrates that the judiciary
is sometimes cognizant of the possible foreign implications of its action. Similar aware-
ness should be extended to the general problems of extraterritoriality." 549 F.2d at 613.
83. Id. See also note 21 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
85. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 (1976).
86. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 40, at 632.
87. See generally Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the Reach
of American Regulatory Jurisdiction, 22 OHIo ST. LJ. 586, 611-27 (1961).
88. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1977), the
Ninth Circuit held that the question of the extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970), should be decided in accordance with
the guidelines set forth in Timberlane.
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of state doctrine 9 nor otherwise be treated precisely as an affirmative
defense.9 0
More important than procedural disparities is that the focus of in-
quiry in the two areas differs. The Timberlane court synthesized this
difference by noting that whereas the act of state doctrine precludes
examining the validity of the foreign governmental interest, under its
jurisdictional analysis the validity of the foreign interest is assumed;
only under the jurisdictional test must the interests of the United States
be explicitly balanced against those of the foreign state.91 While the
court did not account for the probable changes in the act of state doc-
trine, the observation above would still appear to be an accurate state-
ment of a primary distinction between these two areas.
In sum, to say that a foreign interest might be deferred to under the
balancing test yet not be immune from scrutiny under the act of state
doctrine is not to say there is a conflict in the law. Because these doc-
trines deal with different, although closely related, issues, the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason and the restrictive theory of act of state can be
reconciled. 92
89. Even though many of its implications are uncertain, it is clear that Dunhill sets
a rigorous standard for a party who would prove that foreign governmental action is
a nonreviewable act of state. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 691-95 (1976).
90. The Timberlane opinion gives little indication of how the balancing test will be
,called into operation in future cases. Although the court separated the question whether
jurisdiction may be asserted from the question whether jurisdiction should be asserted,
549 F.2d at 613, it is still possible that a motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the proper vehicle to raise the latter
issue.
Similar uncertainties exist with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof. The
Timberlane court found that dismissal was inappropriate because there had been no
"comprehensive analysis of the relative connections and interests of Honduras and the
United States." Id. at 615. It seems that by necessity the burden of raising the foreign
interests not apparent from the plaintiff's pleadings will fall on the party seeking dis-
missal. It is not clear, however, whether that party would carry the burden of proving
all factors which would call for dismissal, or whether the plaintiff should be required
to prove certain elements, such as specific intent on the part of foreign defendants, be-
yond those necessary to establish a basis for subject matter jurisdiction and a claim for
relief. These uncertainties indicate some of the refinements which are called for in this
area on the part of the Ninth Circuit.
91. Id. at 615.
92. The rationale supporting adoption in Dunhill of a restrictive approach to act of
state is in part that adjudication of claims arising out of the commercial activities of
a foreign government is less likely to cause offense than judicial interference with purely
governmental functions. See 425 U.S. at 697-98 (plurality opinion of White, J.); cf. id.
at 715 (concurring opinion of Powell, J.) (adjudication of cases involving commer-
cial activities of foreign governments will not interfere with the conduct of foreign
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the same time it expands and elaborates on some of the implica-
tions of the Alcoa decision, Timberlane may also help resolve some of
the more problematic aspects of Alcoa and it progeny. For over
thirty years, Alcoa has borne the brunt of criticism, both foreign and
domestic, of the intrusiveness of our antitrust laws into the affairs of
other nations. 3 Despite language to the contrary, the basic thrust of
the decision provided a rationale for the potentially unlimited exercise
of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. By contrast, the opinion
in Timberlane provides a principled basis on which a court may decline
to exercise jurisdiction where it appears that the damage to foreign in-
terests which would be caused by adjudication of the claim outweighs
the need to redress the injury to our commerce.
Karen Growdon
relations by the political- branches). There may be a temptation to transpose this
rationale to application of the jurisdictional rule of reason and assert that commercial
operations of a foreign government should in general be accorded less weight than gov-
ernmental activity. Such reasoning would violate the principles set forth in Timberlane.
Adjudicating a quasicontractual claim (the issue in Dunhill) is far less of an intrusion
into the affairs of another nation than subjecting the activities of a government to the
operation of a remedial decree.
93. See, e.g., A.D. NEALE, THE ANTrrRusr LAws OF TIM UI D STATES OF AMERICA
363-64 (1970); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdicion of the American Antitrust Laws,
43 ANTrrrUST LJ. 521, 522 (1974); Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction In Al-
coa, 61 AM. J. INt'L L. 558, 559 (1967).
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